The question of how society should deal with social conflicts arising from cultural differences persists. Should we adopt an exclusivist approach by excluding reasons based on specific cultural traditions (culture-based reasons) from public debates about social policy, especially because these reasons do not appeal to the public at large? Or should we resort to an inclusivist approach by including reasons based on cultural traditions in public debate to give recognition to the diverse cultural identities of those who practice these traditions? While these two approaches assign different roles to cultural traditions in public debate, both seem to welcome compromise between conflicting parties. This paper reviews contending normative approaches for dealing with conflicts in multicultural societies and explores the place of culture-based reasons in public debates designed to resolve conflicts.
Introduction
The question of how society should deal with social conflicts arising out of cultural differences persists. Should we adopt an exclusivist approach by excluding from public debates about social policy reasons based on specific cultural traditions because these reasons do not appeal to the public at large? Or should we resort to an inclusivist approach by including reasons based on cultural traditions in public debate to give recognition to the diverse cultural identities of those who practice these traditions? If excluding culture-based reasons is meant to prevent cultural differences from hindering compromise or if including these same reasons in public debate is meant to ensure that conflicting parties will be able to support any compromise that could come out of public debate, then it may not be exclusion or inclusion of culture-based reasons per se that is crucial in dealing with conflict between cultures. Instead, we need to evaluate every culture-based reason to establish whether it might contribute or hinder compromise and resolution of conflicts. If culturebased reasons facilitate compromise then these reasons deserve inclusion in public debate. However, if culture-based reasons silence opposing views by imposing the primacy of one's own traditions over others preventing conflicting parties from achieving compromise then such reasons should be excluded. This paper reviews contending normative approaches and explores the place of culture-based reasons in public debates. Part I sorts out some conceptual distinctions. Part II reviews two general normative views about the place of culture-based reasons in public deliberation and presents a third way (i.e. a critical-inclusive approach) where the two contending approaches may converge. Part III sketches a model of public debate that could accommodate the convergence that the third approach envisions.
Conceptual distinctions
While it seems easier to appreciate the cultural values of our own social group than those of others, modern liberal democracies require 2 their members to give reasons to support claims about what policies the state should impose in relation to controversial issues. Nevertheless, it seems unreasonable to merely reject the cultural values of others simply because we are unfamiliar with these values. If we expect others to respect our cultural values, we need to respect their cultural values as well. Even so, some odd cultural practices seem too different or too abhorrent for us to tolerate such that we are not able to honestly believe that these practices deserve to be respected.
The term culture can be as broad as to include all sorts of practices or traditions. Notwithstanding the multiplicity of definitions of culture, there seems to be a core concept shared by different understandings of the term. The core concept of culture refers to the pattern of ideas and their attached values and prescriptions that guide behavior (Baldwin, Faulkner, & Hecht, 2006 , p. 8, cf. Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952 . As patterns of ideas and values, cultural traditions are sources of reasons for justifying our claims about what we should do together in society. But how do we assess the relative value of different cultural traditions when they generate social conflict? Besides, cultural traditions are also complex and dynamic such that it is not easy to pinpoint which part or manifestation of a tradition we are evaluating.
Charles Taylor (1994) advised how we may properly assess and judge the comparative value of cultural traditions. Culture should be given recognition without prejudging its worth based on our own cultural standards (Taylor, 1994, pp. 65-72) because cultural traditions "have provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time" and "have something that deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we have to abhor and reject" (Taylor, 1994, pp. 72-73) . But this supposition is subject to scrutiny as we engage in comparative study of cultures. Nevertheless, Taylor seems optimistic that cultural outsiders will be able to judge the worth of a particular culture in an objective way once they step back from the biases of their own cultural standards in a comparative cultural study that would displace "our horizons in the resulting fusions" (Taylor, 1994, p. 73) .
In contrast, Jürgen Habermas explains that because cultural traditions "normally reproduce themselves by convincing those whose personality structures they shape, that is, by motivating them to appropriate productively and continue the traditions" (Habermas, 1994, p. 130) , we should only preserve traditions if we remain convinced of their value. Otherwise, we have the right to reject them. We need not guarantee survival of cultural traditions because doing so would "rob the members of the very freedom to say yes or no that is necessary if they are to appropriate and preserve their cultural heritage" (Habermas, 1994, p. 130) .
However, rejecting cultural traditions (regardless of whether this is from within or from outside a group) may result in conflict with those who cling to such traditions. Nevertheless, opponents may be able to tolerate differences at varying levels. The less tolerant in this case must be made to realize through reasoned argument that the perceived disruption of their autonomy is only apparent and not real. For example, if one does not approve the practice of wearing certain religious clothing in public spaces, it may not be a good reason to say that the objector's freedom is disrupted. It is not disrupted because the objector can still wear whatever she likes. Insisting that others refrain from wearing certain traditional clothing might in fact put the objector's freedom to wear whatever clothing she likes at stake. Even so, the objector might insist that public spaces must be kept neutral. Would an appeal to contemporary cultural traditions or familiar practices be an appropriate justification for objecting to wearing traditional or religious clothing in public spaces? Could people defend the right to wear traditional costumes in public spaces on the basis of reasons from their own cultures?
What are culture-based reasons?
In modern liberal democracies, a proposed public policy that will be funded by taxpayer's money and that will be imposed on residents and citizens requires legitimation through wide public deliberation and/or democratically delegated debate among representatives or some duly appointed expert panel that will articulate and assess reasons for adopting or rejecting such a public proposal. The kind of reasons usually included in public debates and deliberations are culture-neutral reasons or reasons that have wide public appeal and which do not favor a particular cultural tradition, whether it be Muslim, Christian, atheist, etc.
3 Culture-neutral reasons, because of their impartial nature and general appeal, do not have properties that might alienate any group in a multicultural society. They are used in arguments intended to be acceptable to all in a public debate (Bohman, 1995) . Reasons that do not favor any group but simply facilitate the fair interaction of all individuals in a multicultural society are culture-neutral. For example, reasons that invoke Rawls's two principles of justice are culture-neutral since these principles prescribe basic rights for 4 Culture-based reason is similar to what Simone Chambers calls "private reasons" or "reasons and justifications that cannot be shared by the general public" (Chambers, 2004, p. 391) . While the term private reason reflects its scope of appeal, i.e. the private sphere, I use the term culture-based reason to emphasize that the reason is based on a cultural tradition or worldview shared by members of a specific cultural group. John Rawls uses the term non-public reasons to refer to a similar idea as "comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines" (Rawls, 1993, p. 217) 5 For example, cultural differences associated with ethnic diversity have been shown to affect economic development, even after controlling for violent conflicts such as civil war (Easterly & Levine, 1997 ; see also Alesina & Drazen, 1991) . This is particularly true if such multicultural societies lack good institutions (Easterly, 2001). everyone, regardless of cultural affiliation, and equality of opportunity for all. In contrast, reasons that invoke authority for deciding on a public policy based on what a particular religious text (e.g. the Bible) prescribes are not culture-neutral since only those who belong to the religion that recognize the authority of such text can recognize these reasons. Reasons of this latter kind are culture-based reasons. A reason is culture-based when the foundation of its correctness or truth rests on a worldview or a set of traditional beliefs held only by members of a particular group and not by members of other groups. 4 A proposed public policy can favor particular groups, for example the policy proposed in the United States requiring that special creation be taught in the public school curricula alongside the Darwinian Theory of evolution. Such a proposal is rejected by opponents because it favors a Christian religious viewpoint and cannot be supported on such grounds by citizens who have different beliefs about the origin of species. There could be reasons that find support in many different cultural traditions but these reasons are not, as stipulated in this essay, culturebased. For example, reasons that invoke the Golden Rule of reciprocity, although prescribed by many if not all religions or cultures, are not culture-based but culture-neutral. Invoking reciprocity can appeal to the wider public because reciprocity is essential to cooperation and has the potential to facilitate exchanges and compromise between competing groups in a multicultural society. Nevertheless, reciprocity as a reason is not culture-based since its correctness does not rest on traditional beliefs held only by members of a particular group. Rather, it is a culture-neutral reason that is also widely accepted by different cultural groups.
General normative views
A just social policy could attract support from differing sides that appreciate a just order as a fundamental enabling condition for the flourishing of their own distinct ways of living and thinking. Multicultural societies still face conflicting cultural traditions that could adversely affect their common interests in one way or another.
5 Should we try to preserve minority cultural traditions at the expense of restricting the rights of others to free movement (as in the case of maintaining indigenous American reservations in North America)? Must we protect free speech at the expense of offending the cherished values of some groups (as in the case of the Danish cartoon and Salman Rushdie controversies)? Advocates of freedom of speech as well as defenders of respect for religious beliefs try to persuade their governments to force others to respect their right to practice their own beliefs and traditions. How do we resolve these conflicts?
Exclusive approach: set aside cultural differences and adopt culturally neutral principles John Rawls prescribes that a just society should be organized according to principles selected using a culture-blind perspective, i.e. members of a just society should set aside and exclude culture-based reasons when choosing principles of justice. This view has been criticized for ignoring (or for excluding) cultural identity 6 as a relevant consideration in choosing principles of justice and for favoring a culture-neutral view of how the basic structure of society should be arranged on the basis of "a constitution…which all [free and equal] citizens…may be reasonably expected to endorse…in the light of principle… acceptable to their common human reason" (Rawls, 1993, p. 137) . Such culture-neutral common human reason enables people that disagree on substantive matters (or cultural beliefs) to live together and cooperate in society despite their disagreements. In order to avoid intractable disagreement on substantive issues that are unlikely to be resolved, Rawls prescribes that conflicting parties should agree on procedures instead. John Rawls calls this move a "method of avoidance" (Rawls, 1985, pp. 230-231; 240 cf. Bohman, 1995, pp. 254-255) . Appeals to non-public reasons, since these are based on "comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines", will not work in fostering cooperation and stability in society so he prescribes appealing to public reasons that could be explained in terms of public good and the "ideals and principles expressed by society's conception of political justice" (Rawls, 1993, p. 217 ). Rawls's public reasons are similar to what I call culture-neutral reasons and his non-public reasons (Rawls, 1993, p. 220) are somewhat similar to what I call culture-based reasons. Avoiding cultural differences would then allow adherence to culture-neutral (or cultural-blind) principles which include: (1) equal right to basic liberty, and (2) permitting social and economic inequality only when it maximizes the welfare of the worse-off and only if social and economic positions are open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (1999, p. 60) . If the right principles of justice are not chosen when we include culture-based reasons in deliberating how to establish social cooperation, these culture-based reasons should be excluded.
Jürgen Habermas, while not directly advocating culture-neutrality as Rawls does, seems to agree with Rawls in assuming that individuals have a built-in rational capacity to evaluate for themselves which elements of their culture are worth keeping and rejecting. He implies this when he explains that "Cultural heritages and the forms of life articulated in them normally reproduce themselves by convincing those whose personality structures they shape, that is, by motivating them to appropriate productively and continue the traditions" (Habermas, 1994, p. 130) . This is precisely the reason why society cannot guarantee survival of cultural traditions "For to guarantee survival would necessarily rob the members of the very freedom to say yes or no that is necessary if they are to appropriate and preserve their cultural heritage" (Habermas, 1994, p. 130) . In other words, the freedom to say yes or no to a cultural practice is not negotiable and cannot be trumped by the need to preserve a culture.
The right of individuals to say yes or no to continuing with the practice of their group's cultural traditions must be respected. But this very same freedom seems to fuel the kind of conflict that emerges from rejecting cultural traditions from within a group or between different groups. For Habermas, culture-based reasons can be set aside or must be set aside when these reasons undermine the freedom to say yes or no. Culture-based reasons must have the quality to convince and must appeal to human reason if they deserve to be preserved.
James Bohman (1995) recognizes that the source of social conflict does not merely lie on the level of differing traditions. The conflict runs deep when its very source is conflicting standards for evaluating the worth of culture-based reasons. How can we properly evaluate any type of reason if the standards for evaluating these are themselves subject to deeply conflicting interpretations? Bohman criticizes Rawls's failure to resolve the problem of irreconcilable values or deep conflicts by arguing that neither overlapping consensus nor avoidance is sufficient to settle the question of the public basis of justification for solutions to deep cultural conflicts. He proposes that deep conflict can be resolved if we revise Rawls and Habermas's liberal approach to public deliberation in two ways: (1) make the political conception of justice more dynamic (not fixed as Rawls seems to advocate) and (2) make public reason "plural" and not "singular". Rather than endorsing one singular public reason (overlapping consensus), we must make public reason plural and require all groups to be open to compromise and to changing their own views and beliefs to avoid persistent political inequalities between them. Despite the controversy about whether to exclude or include culture-based reasons in public deliberation, Bohman's compromise approach and Rawlsian culture neutrality seem to have similar practical implications. The Rawlsian requirement to exclude cultural traditions and be neutral may in some sense imply making a compromise with regards to these traditions such that political cooperation could be achieved. To compromise means one still holds a distinct view based on one's culture but sets this view aside (or changes it) to enable cooperation with others who hold a conflicting view. The same thing is done by being neutral about substantive cultural beliefs or comprehensive worldviews. One can still hold distinct cultural views but not count them as reasons for not cooperating with others. What is different in Bohman's approach is his requirement to be open to change even one's own cultural views (Bohman, 1995, p. 270) in order to attain political equality between conflicting cultures. This demand to be willing to revise cultural views is not part of liberal neutrality since setting aside cultural beliefs to be neutral about it in public deliberation is not the same as changing these excluded cultural beliefs. Cultural beliefs and practices that are set aside could remain unchanged and intact and still be held and practiced by a believer in private. These unchanged private beliefs and practices may still bring conflict when they surface in public and are noticed by those opposed to them.
Inclusive approach: mutually recognize cultural differences by including culture-based reasons
Bohman's critique of liberal monolithic public reason in favor of including other reasons in developing compromise on the table of multicultural negotiation seems to agree with Charles Taylor's approach. Taylor argues that multicultural conflicts can be solved by mutually recognizing cultural differences through "fusion of horizons", an idea he borrowed from Hans-Georg Gadamer (Taylor, 1994, pp. 66-73) . Taylor builds his case for a politics of difference by presenting a critique of liberalism's failure to account for modern pluriform societies' lack of brotherhood (solidarity) which is essential if liberalism's politics of equal dignity is to work. He argues that the politics of recognition he proposes is better than liberal neutrality because it allows the preservation and survival of cultural identity of minorities through mutual recognition that results from "willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must displace our horizons in the resulting fusions" (Taylor, 1994, p. 73) . The idea of including multiple standards of reason also finds support in I. M. Young's (2002) proposal that we become truly inclusive by employing subjective elements (as opposed to liberal emphasis on objectivity) in political communication. Related to this view, John Dryzek (2000) argues that we should prevent hierarchies between those who have different cultural views. We do this by engaging in free deliberation that is inclusive (i.e. connect the particular to the general). This is supported by Adeno Addis's (1997) view that we should develop public reason that emerges out of dialogue among various communities as they employ their own reasons to justify their views. For such emerging pluralistic public reason to work and attract support from all participants, it should really be a product of dialogue and should bring together differing views and cultural traditions ideally in their revised or adjusted forms.
The idea of revising or modifying views to develop pluralistic public reason is supported by Will Kymlicka's idea of revisability of cultural differences. Kymlicka (1995) argues that we should reject the idea that people's differences (varying/conflicting ends) are fixed and beyond rational revision. One could only preserve difference (as a way of respecting community rights) in a group if that group (wishing to preserve its cultural identity) also allows and respects being different within their group. This tolerance within a cultural group is the criterion for being eligible for tolerance by other groups.
One could go a step further in clamoring for an inclusive approach in deliberating cultural conflicts. Others argue for inclusion by recognition between cultures (Taylor, 1994) , tolerance within cultures (Kymlicka, 1995) , and making public reason plural and inclusive (Bohman, 1995) in public deliberation. Furthermore, a case has been made in favor of even forcing cultural groups who refuse to explain their controversial practice in public to justify their views in public deliberation. May Thorseth (1999 Thorseth ( , 2001 ) argues that it is legitimate to paternalistically force conflicting parties to communicate and justify their cultural norms and practices in open public debate in order to allow participants to evaluate and change their views, if necessary, through the use of argumentation. This paternalistic imposition to justify one's cultural tradition is a legitimate imposition because it enables autonomous revision of wills by helping conflicting parties to recognize (rather than reject or ignore) their differences. This paternalistic imposition to subject one's contested cultural norms and practices to deliberation enables (rather than limits) autonomy because engaging in deliberation gives voice to the agent and gives her discursive space to freely revise her norms and practices. Coercing one to argue for one's contested norms is necessary in enabling participants to be free agents and in making possible a community of moral persons and moral practice. Such paternalistic imposition excludes the use of fundamentalist procedures as (1) censorship or exclusion of views from communication, and (2) refusal to revise (or change) views that are proven wrong (as required by reason in open public debate). Forceful inclusion is compatible with Habermas's (1994) argument for legitimate legislation of recognition of difference (as mutual respect) which requires judgment of acceptance or rejection of such difference as a result of using "reason" in public discourse/deliberation. The autonomy enabling paternalistic coercion required in Thorseth's view could provide an institutional avenue for enforcing both Bohman's multiple-reasons-compromise approach as well as inclusive versions of liberal neutrality in resolving multicultural conflict.
Critical-inclusive approach: include culture-based reasons but scrutinize them for their merits
Different authors vary in their emphases about whether or not to include culture-based reasons in public debate but their views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Similarly, the distinctions I make between the three views are not necessarily hard and fast but simply serve to indicate three tendencies that after all may be present, in varying degrees, in the accounts presented by authors. Nevertheless, I have classified the different variations into three views merely as a heuristic device to analyze the three tendencies: exclusive, inclusive and criticalinclusive but without being committed to strictly demarcating boundaries between these views. The only commitment is to develop a defensible account of inclusion of culture-based reasons in public debates that emphasizes critical evaluation of such reasons. Thus, the key distinctive of the critical-inclusive approach is its emphasis on critical evaluation of included culture-based reasons. As an example of what a critical-inclusive approach would look like, I discuss the approach proposed by Alex Friedman (2008) regarding why and how we should critically include private reasons (or non-public reasons) in public debate. The critical evaluation needed in inclusion, as proposed by Friedman, is similar to that of Habermas (1994). 7 In contrast, most inclusive approaches seem to emphasize other things than the critical evaluation the critical-inclusive approach prescribes. For example, Bohman (1995, pp. 255-256 ) emphasized inclusion and compromise without explicitly discounting critical scrutiny (with his emphasis on revisability of common framework of political justification) but implies priority of inclusion over revision by his emphasis on having more than one "public standpoint" of what culture-neutral reason (or public reason) should be.
8 Related to such 7 Note that while Habermas (1994) excludes fundamentalist procedures and exclusionist attitudes as being incompatible with the kind of tolerance needed in public debate (Habermas, 1994, p. 132 ff.) he highlights an important aspect of the critical-inclusive view. This is most evident in his requirement that cultural traditions justify their continued practice to those who hold them, i.e. if culture-based reasons are to be included in public debates these reasons must be subjected to critical scrutiny. Those who hold such reasons must allow practitioners of other cultures to also present their case (Habermas, 139 ). Related to this, Thorseth (1999 Thorseth ( , 2001 ) defended the view that groups that have a conflicting view with the majority should be compelled to communicate their cultural distinctive in open public debate. 8 Bohman calls these culture-based reasons "plural public reasons" in the sense that these reasons are publicly accessible and can be used as one of the many norms of reasonableness in public deliberation (Bohman, 1995, pp. 262-263) . Making culture-based reasons publicly accessible requires, as Dryzek (2000) prescribes, translating these reasons that are particular to a culture into a general form that can be appreciated by others who belong to different cultures.
pluralistic inclusion, Addis (1997) prescribes utilizing each cultural group's own reasons in justifying their respective views when they engage in public dialogue. 9 But such a maneuver in pluralizing norms of reasonableness weakens the ability of conflicting parties to scrutinize their favorite views since their own culture-based standards would tend to affirm their own views instead of seriously criticizing them. This priority of inclusion is also present in Taylor's (1994, pp. 66-67 ) emphasis on presumption of equal worth that will guide our comparison of our different cultural practices, and perhaps even our culture-based reasons for defending these traditions and beliefs.
What emerges from the "exclusion-inclusion divide" discussed above is the need to develop a "qualified approach" to inclusion. The need to qualify what it is required to properly include multiple types of reasons in public deliberation is implied both in liberal neutrality as well as in communitarian and deliberative inclusive approaches. To qualify for inclusion we basically need to add (or emphasize) one more step in the deliberative process. The additional step we need is critical evaluation of reasons (using both subjective and objective standards). We need to evaluate the worth of culture-based reasons in forging the compromise we need in resolving multicultural conflict. This step may already be a part of both the exclusive and inclusive approaches surveyed above. Even so, we need to emphasize this if we are to show that exclusive and inclusive approaches converge in their practical goal of resolving cultural conflict by making adjustments to the elements that clash. Such adjustments (revisions, fusions of horizon, compromises) can only be afforded if we apply critical scrutiny to the reasons we include in justifying claims in public deliberation. Bohman may have implied this idea of critical scrutiny in his plurality of reasons proposal but this is more explicit in Alex Friedman's (2008) account of an inclusive approach. Friedman's account is similar to Bohman's in the sense that both argue that the justification for public decisions should include a plurality of reasons (as opposed to liberal insistence on public "reason" only). But Friedman adds that we also need to evaluate the merits of reasons to be included in public deliberation. He does this by criticizing the liberal procedural approach that excludes religious reasons because of its non-public source of authority. Instead, Friedman advocates hearing reasons out without regard to their source (religious or secular), in order to assess their merits (evaluated based on the ideals of consistency, plausibility, reasonableness).
It is helpful to outline the context of Friedman's proposal to see what could motivate the critical-inclusive approach I sketch here. Friedman's article targets Norman Daniels and James Sabin's (2002) solution to resolving (or avoiding) intractable disagreements in healthcare rationing through fair deliberative procedures that fulfill four conditions: transparency, relevance, revisability, and enforcement. Intractable disagreement in healthcare rationing is analogous to multicultural disagreements in the sense that the fundamental basis of conflicting positions also includes value judgments (e.g. Kantian versus Utilitarian). Friedman concentrates his critique on the relevance condition for procedural fairness, particularly that its insistence on including public reasons only, while excluding nonpublic reasons as irrelevant, will not work in making deliberation fair and legitimate.
According to Friedman, the problem with insisting that we include public reasons only is that disagreements in healthcare rationing are not merely about the relative weight of considerations but the importance of life-or-death implications of the decision to losers, especially since they will not be able to support rationing outcomes that could adversely affect them. It is also difficult for even reasonable people to agree about which type of reasons should count as relevant public reasons and which should be excluded as only private reasons. Friedman proposes we should hear out even what seems to be private reasons since including these reasons in deliberation will allow the possibility of even those reasons being revised (Friedman, 2008, p. 108 fn. 38) . To set the relevance condition against such a strict standard is too demanding for deliberators because only political philosophers normally employ coherent, clear, consistent, and compelling enough reasons that could satisfy such a standard, thus excluding other kinds of reasons (e.g. faith-based reasons). To insist on such a standard of relevance is to limit democratic participation only to those who employ a type of public reasoning such that only Utilitarians, Kantians, or Liberals would be able to join in. Since there is no clear way to distinguish bad reasons from good reasons, we cannot exclude faith-based reasons a priori without hearing them out and finding if they are indeed as divisive, controversial, or unlikely to produce consensus as they seem to be. To remedy the insufficiency of the relevance condition in Daniels and Sabin's fair procedures approach, Friedman suggests the inclusion of non-public reasons (e.g. faith-based reasons) in the deliberation process. He adds, however, that these included reasons must be evaluated for consistency, reasonableness, and plausibility in the same way as public reasons are evaluated.
The advantage of including non-public reasons in deliberation, as Friedman proposes, is the opportunity it affords in helping deliberators to be aware of the details of the values and beliefs of those who hold such reasons as well as giving each of the conflicting sides the chance to realize what may be wrong or right about these reasons. Having these nonpublic reasons critically included in the deliberation process also increases the chances of inviting support (from those whose private reasons are included) for whatever outcome the deliberation produces. These groups whose private reasons are included would more likely support the outcome of the deliberation than they would if their reasons are excluded. The same critical-inclusion of non-public reasons also makes the deliberation outcome more legitimate, especially when the policy outcome is to be imposed widely. It is not legitimate to impose a policy on those whose views have not been included (by exclusion of their reasons) in its deliberation.
Model of public debate
Since their truth or correctness of culture-based reasons rests on the worldview held only by the group who invokes them, their acceptance by other groups is unpredictable if not unlikely. It is contingent upon the features of the worldviews on which they are based and so agreement between different groups holding different worldviews cannot rely on such reasons but on something else, say, the willingness of parties to compromise. Furthermore, agreement on substantive claims argued on the basis of diverging culture-based reasons originating from different cultural sources of authority is very difficult if not impossible to achieve. For example, those who argue against the use of artificial contraceptives on the basis of arguments sourced from the authority of religious doctrine that say the divine purpose of sex is procreation cannot agree with those who defend the use of contraceptives but do not recognize the authority of religious doctrine. The disagreement between holders of the two conflicting positions is intractable precisely because the conflicting groups have different and sometimes contradicting sources of authority. If citizens disagree on substantive issues, such issues cannot be the basis of public policy that will be implemented through political coercion of citizens. Instead, ground rules or procedures that can be accepted as fair by contending parties must be established. Dealing with intractable disagreement on substantive issues can be avoided by focusing instead, as Rawlsian proceduralists propose, on agreement on procedures (Rawls, 1985, pp. 230-231, 240) . Since people disagree about "comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines" we cannot base our claims to public policy on these non-public reasons which I refer to as culture-based reasons. Nevertheless, agreement on procedures may not be enough. Disagreement on substantive issues could persist and the only available resort is compromise that is facilitated by fair procedures. Even if the only goal is compromise, proponents of competing policies will still have no other reasons to appeal to but their own favorite culture-based reasons. These non-public reasons (as Rawls calls them) should not be presented in the public arena and to members of other groups in their original partisan form. One way of making these culture-based reasons more suitable for public consideration is by utilizing communication that connects the particular to the general (Dryzek, 2000, pp. 68-69) . 10 In communicating culture-based reasons, proponents must try their best to connect the features of their particular concern to more universal values, for example relating the concern for discrimination of a particular ethnic group to the more universal concern for equality. In negotiating policies through public bodies, culture-based reasons must be translated into general principles that can facilitate compromise between those that reject particular culturebased reasons but at the same time recognize general principles that overlap with these reasons. For example, the concern for the value of the fetus in stem cell research as expressed by Catholics overlaps with the concern for human dignity that can be negotiated at the level of general principles recognized by a public body such as a bioethics committee. Alternative sources of stem cells could then be proposed as a compromise between the valued goals of science and the concerns of a particular religious or faith-based group.
A critical-inclusive approach to public debate can be implemented through the intentional use of various communication tools, especially online, to engage the public, to invite the articulation, deliberation and evaluation of all sorts of views and reasons.
11
The use of deliberative communication tools is extensive in James Fishkin's deliberative polling initiative (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004; Fishkin, 1991 Fishkin, , 1997 Fishkin, , 2005 . These deliberative exercises expose arguments to open scrutiny, and give participants opportunity to rethink and revise their views after considering the views of others and acquiring more information. This is in line with the spirit of requiring members of society to express their views even if they may not want to (Thorseth, 2009 (Thorseth, , 2011 . Using online communication media has the advantage of reaching more people without being limited by time and space while simultaneously documenting the deliberation for transparency and for everyone to review if needed, especially when they reconsider their views. One basic assumption in requiring deliberative engagement is that the necessary and basic enabling conditions (e.g. literacy, sufficient mental and physical health) are already in place for people to have the ability to participate. Some minority groups may not be able to participate in deliberation due to poverty and political exclusion. It is therefore crucial to remedy their deprivation and empower them politically before they can be enlisted in deliberating their own norms and practices that are contested (Alvarez, 2009 ).
Critically including culture-based reasons in the stem cell debate
The public debate about stem cell research illustrates the difficulty of using culturebased reasons in persuading opponents and adjudicators about the correctness of a particular view. Earlier technology allowed human embryonic stem cells (hESC) to be harvested from embryos but the embryos had to be discarded afterwards. Many groups oppose this technique because of their objection to embryos being discarded. Proponents defend the technology as a promising way of developing life-saving treatments for the many who suffer from diseases such as Parkinson's disease. They also reject partisan culture-based reasons as unfairly privileging some conservative cultural traditions. It is understandable that some conservative groups have qualms about hESC and perhaps it is easy for opponents to connect their particular traditional concerns about the moral status of embryos to the general widespread intuition about the value of early human life (Denker, 2006) . Perhaps, such a widely held consensus justifies restrictions on hESC research in many countries. The alternative technology for harvesting stem cells from adults (instead of embryos) or so-called induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSC) seems promising at first but similar objections (Denker, 2006) have been raised in relation to the cells potential to develop into a human embryo in addition to the need to keep using hESCs as controls for "stemness" in experiments. Objectors to iPSC invoke culture-based reasons about the moral status of stem cells or the potential of these cells to develop into something with moral status. An exclusive approach would simply set aside such culture-based reasons in favor of a fair procedure for deciding that everyone could reasonably accept. The losing minority would find it difficult to support the results of such procedures. An inclusive approach would trivialize the disagreements and would hold back deliberators from criticizing any culture-based reasons out of respect or tolerance. A critically-inclusive approach would not exclude culture-based reasons, even faith-based ones, in the debate but would encourage their authors to try to relate these reasons to more general concerns that can be shared by opponents. For example, particular concerns for the embryo could still be upheld by relating this to the more general concern for caution in manipulating the building blocks of life in view of possible unintended adverse environmental, social, economic or political effects of the technology. Concern for the embryo (or even the potentiality objection) may not necessarily appeal to everyone but it has the potential to appeal to those who hold precautionary attitudes to technology that are not faith-based (Hughes, 2010). The opposing positions could then be appraised as being probably correct instead of being rejected outright as wrong.
12 Each side could take into consideration the culture-based reasons presented by others and together they could critically evaluate the merits of those reasons in public debate.
Remaining problems
Resolving conflicts through compromise and mutual openness to revision of cultural traditions through deliberation enables autonomy to flourish and is beneficial to autonomous agency. However, by opening up all cultural norms and practices to revision we might undermine efforts to preserve cultural identity as such. Openness to revision respects autonomy but an individual could resist revision to preserve cultural identity. One may say that identity preservation is trumped by openness to revision when the former undermines autonomy. However, the imperative to be open to revision could also undermine autonomy when one chooses to preserve a socially disruptive cultural practice. Deliberation may open up the possibility for revision but it is not guaranteed since autonomy allows cultural traditions to be preserved.
What seems to matter here is having a dialogically informed choice, for the sake of autonomy, regardless of whether the individual chooses to preserve or revise her cultural views. The question that remains is this: when is it better for autonomy to preserve or revise? Should it be just for the sake of being free to preserve or revise? Is freedom to preserve also important for the sake of something else, say, cultural diversity that results from protecting some cultural practices endangered by conformity to modern ways of living? The debate about the place of culture-based reasons in public debate seems to relate to such a presumption about the value of autonomy without saying that one should be committed to such a presumption. It raises a question about the value of autonomy that remains to be answered in another paper. Citing the persisting problem of autonomy as a potential threat to diversity rehearses an unresolved problem in the politics of recognition debate, i.e. Is autonomy always more important than diversity? Even if we define autonomy as freedom from coercion and the willingness to change convictions only in response to argument (Feinberg, 1986, p. 37) , susceptibility to argument presupposes a standard of reasoning that participants in deliberation recognize. One could appeal to religious traditions as the source of epistemic authority while others could insist that the basis for resolving a disagreement should be outside or neutral to each opponent's respective traditions. Wouldn't the adoption of a third standard, even if neutral, tantamount to each opponent being coerced into abandoning their foundational beliefs? These two problems are too complex to adequately develop in this paper.
Conclusion
I have reviewed two general normative views about the place of culture-based reasons in public deliberation: an exclusive approach and an inclusive approach. The exclusive approach prescribes the exclusion of reasons based on cultural traditions from public debate since these reasons are usually considered private reasons. The inclusive approach favours the inclusion of culture-based reasons in public debate, to give recognition to or affirm (rather than be neutral about) cultural differences. Exclusion is intended to maintain a culture-neutral public standpoint. Inclusion is meant to affirm (rather than ignore) cultural differences as bases for forging "compromise" between conflicting beliefs. While the two approaches differ on how they value cultural traditions in public debate, both seem to support the importance of compromise between conflicting parties. I also sketched what I call a critical-inclusive view where the two contending approaches may converge. If excluding culture-based reasons is meant to prevent cultural differences from becoming hindrances to compromise, and if including these reasons in public debate is meant to ensure that conflicting parties will be able to support any compromise that could come out of public debate, then it is not exclusion or inclusion of culture-based reasons per se that is crucial in dealing with multicultural conflict. What is important, rather, is the evaluation of particular culture-based reasons as to whether these could contribute or hinder compromise in public deliberation. If particular culture-based reasons facilitate compromise, allow other culture-based reasons to be heard, and contribute to resolving conflicts, these reasons deserve inclusion in public debate. However, if culture-based reasons exclude or silence opposing views and prevent conflicting parties from reaching compromise, these reasons do not deserve inclusion in public debates, precisely because these reasons negate an important goal of deliberation. The claim that the judgment to include or exclude certain culture-based reasons should be based on evaluating these reasons as to whether they could contribute to compromise is more of a practical ideal, i.e. everyone who is concerned with resolving political conflict between cultures has an interest in looking for ways to achieve compromise. Thus, so long as the inclusion of culture-based reasons benefits the goal of resolving conflict, then the culture-based reasons to be included must have qualities that are consistent with this goal or ideal. The evaluation of culture-based reasons cannot be based merely on the substantive norms that each culture recognizes (as Bohman's plurality of public reasons seems to suggest) but also on the practical quality these reasons contribute to compromise between conflicting parties. As Friedman, suggested, we must hear out what private reasons have to say first before we subject them to critical evaluation, rather than excluding them a priori (Friedman, 2008, p. 109) . Online deliberative models of public debate have the potential to accommodate the convergence of opposing views that a critical-inclusive approach envisions by facilitating translation of particular elements of culture-based reasons into a general form that other cultures can understand and appreciate. Nevertheless, the tension remains between valuing autonomy and preserving diversity, a problem in need of further discussion in another paper.
